On Nihilism (a dumbed down approach)
Nihilism has a long history. The history of the word, as well as the history of what has been associated with the word. We are not interested here in tracing a history of the word or its signification. What we want to try to focus on is the ascription of the word to particular instances. First we want to ascribe this word to a variety of situations related to meaning. It is not the absence of meaning that we would like to call Nihilism. What we would like to call nihilism is being trapped in an emptiness (nihil) and the various attempts to deal with this entrapping. What kind of emptiness are we talking about? Not an emptiness of the existentialist kind or a physical emptiness: It is an emptiness related to goal and orientation in life (sens in French rather than meaning in English). What orientation? We are all conditioned in such a way that a goal or an orientation for our life is a ground for our engagement with life and with others. When this orientation lacks, or is reflected upon and rejected consciously or unconsciously, a certain emptiness emerges. It is an emptiness associated with dissatisfaction and could be related to a lack in psychoanalytic terms, but it cannot be reduced to that. While the impossibility of fulfilling desires, of attaining certain needs may create an emptiness, these particular instances are not what interested in exploring. We will be talking about the emptiness that does not come and go, but one that stays there and takes control of every aspects of our engagements, consciously or unconsciously.
Is this emptiness related to belief? It may be. When we talked earlier about goal and orientation in life, we did not elaborate on where these goals and orientations come from, or are presumed to come from. In most instances, goals or orientations are acquired through a socialization, acculturation, and subjectivization [conditioning] processes that carry both social-historical, or sociological dimensions and the psychological-phenomenological, or personal experiences. It is inevitable that these dimensions provide beliefs, not necessarily in the shape of ready-made belief systems, but in the guise of a complex set of beliefs and counter-beliefs rooted in daily engagements within a social-historical era. We believe in things, even though these beliefs are not necessarily condoned or sold to us by others, they are inevitably provided by these others. If particular beliefs are accepted by the overall society, the so-called individuals who build their goals according to them can fit in so-called society. If these particular beliefs are not condoned by the overall society, the individuals who built their goals according to them will either reform by suppressing these goals, successfully or not, or will turn psychotic, criminal, or sublimate these goals by projecting them unto other socially more acceptable goals. Actually, societies as a whole function this way as well, and why could not talk of a psychotic society, it is easy to understand what is meant by schizophrenic, violent, and/or entertainment-happy populace.
There are instances where the repression succeeds. Other instances where it fails. A certain discontent results from not being able to implement goals that have been produced within the sphere of licit or illicit social interactions. Sublimation and repression are the basic reactions to this dissatisfaction. Now at the social level, there are means of accommodating and integrating certain goals that are not widely acceptable: social change allows for this whenever social-historical institutions are due to adapt to the changes of its productions. Social-historical institutions adapt either peacefully or forcefully, through so called social revolutions. Nothing in revolutions is external to the social-historical course itself. It would be deluded to think that human beings can effectuate any changes that the social-historical conditions are not ready and set for, or even calling for. This reification of the social-historical will not be construed as such if the social-historical institutions are described as then sum total of human events and interpretations stratifying to the point before change: here, we are close to Diodorus KronosÃ’ affirmation of motion and possibility: nothing will happen differently than the way it happened, or more precisely, potentiality is realized possibility and nothing else. This is what is otherwise known as "contingency becoming necessity." Since history is written after the fact, it is tautological: nothing can be described differently from the way it is--even though we are not here addressing the question of communication and are assuming a perfect concordance between description and events which will prove to be an impossibility and an illusory subliminal creation.
Thus, no matter how much individuals struggle to change, change is not possible outside of the social-historical conditions, and whatever contributions of so-called individuals to the overall social-historical development is already embedded by what the social-historical has invested in this so-called individual. Let us change terminology. The individual should be called the multiple self and society should be called the social imaginary. There is no multiple self outside of the social imaginary. It is the social imaginary that gives all significations to the multiple self and the multiple self flourishes on that basis: even though the particular occurences or experiences that it endures are not shared by other multiple selves, they are still part of the social imaginary and embedded in it in a positive way. Let us imagine a large receptacle. The receptacle is filled with water and wine. Let us imagine a small receptacle that is thrown into the larger receptacle. That receptacle is also filled with water and wine. Assuming that water and wine mix and produce various concentrations, the concentrations in the main receptacle may differ from that of the small receptacle but the content is one and the same. Assuming that some bacterial life emerges in the various areas of the receptacle, some bacterial lives are different than others due to the particular concentrations enveloping them. What lives in the small receptacle is different than what lives outside it, but it is all made possible through and by the large receptacle. There is no way the small receptacle could be considered separately from the overall receptacle, as one cannot reduce the small receptacle to the larger one since it has certain differences that qualify it as unique, especially if there are multiple other receptacles within the large receptacle. The multiple self is that small receptacle within a larger receptacle that is the social imaginary. One cannot dissociate the two entirely, they are connected and the connection between the two is integral to defining each.
The emptiness that we talked about earlier is when the multiple self cannot breathe in the social imaginary. It is aware of its situation but cannot breathe, act, fulfill anything that can be construed as a goal or orientation. This emptiness results from a certain reflection, a self reflection on the goals and orientation and the beliefs grounding them. One form of suppressing this emptiness is by creating emptiness all around, a deluded attempt at destruction as if destruction would make a difference. One finds the emptiness overwhelming and either tries to disprove it by believing that something could be done, even if it is an attempt of spreading that emptiness, or sharing it. This is what exemplifies itself in literary and artistic creations, or in aphoristic or philosophical depictions of the state of the world in what claims to be an acute clarity stage of reflection. This is where we come back to nihilism.
The nihilism that we are talking about is of that kind of sublimation. It is not nihilism then if nihilism means or represents the emptiness described above. Nor is revolutionary action aiming at destruction and annihilation nihilism in other sense than the one described above: a sublimational activity attempting at evading the emptiness at issue.
We will not be addressing the question of emptiness then, but a different question, that of nihilism. Nihilism has a relatedness to this emptiness but a reactive one, if one may say so. Communication requires a set of conventional signs and symbols that are productive. They produce meanings. It seems that if anything could be said about the emptiness pointed to above is the groundlessness that takes away from any goal or orientation or any meaningful productivity. Writing, talking, communicating, destroying, all are activities that are, by and in themselves goals and orientations. How can they be compared to that emptiness that is defined as a lack of orientation and goal?
1997 - From Class notes on Nihilism
Nihilism has a long history. The history of the word, as well as the history of what has been associated with the word. We are not interested here in tracing a history of the word or its signification. What we want to try to focus on is the ascription of the word to particular instances. First we want to ascribe this word to a variety of situations related to meaning. It is not the absence of meaning that we would like to call Nihilism. What we would like to call nihilism is being trapped in an emptiness (nihil) and the various attempts to deal with this entrapping. What kind of emptiness are we talking about? Not an emptiness of the existentialist kind or a physical emptiness: It is an emptiness related to goal and orientation in life (sens in French rather than meaning in English). What orientation? We are all conditioned in such a way that a goal or an orientation for our life is a ground for our engagement with life and with others. When this orientation lacks, or is reflected upon and rejected consciously or unconsciously, a certain emptiness emerges. It is an emptiness associated with dissatisfaction and could be related to a lack in psychoanalytic terms, but it cannot be reduced to that. While the impossibility of fulfilling desires, of attaining certain needs may create an emptiness, these particular instances are not what interested in exploring. We will be talking about the emptiness that does not come and go, but one that stays there and takes control of every aspects of our engagements, consciously or unconsciously.
Is this emptiness related to belief? It may be. When we talked earlier about goal and orientation in life, we did not elaborate on where these goals and orientations come from, or are presumed to come from. In most instances, goals or orientations are acquired through a socialization, acculturation, and subjectivization [conditioning] processes that carry both social-historical, or sociological dimensions and the psychological-phenomenological, or personal experiences. It is inevitable that these dimensions provide beliefs, not necessarily in the shape of ready-made belief systems, but in the guise of a complex set of beliefs and counter-beliefs rooted in daily engagements within a social-historical era. We believe in things, even though these beliefs are not necessarily condoned or sold to us by others, they are inevitably provided by these others. If particular beliefs are accepted by the overall society, the so-called individuals who build their goals according to them can fit in so-called society. If these particular beliefs are not condoned by the overall society, the individuals who built their goals according to them will either reform by suppressing these goals, successfully or not, or will turn psychotic, criminal, or sublimate these goals by projecting them unto other socially more acceptable goals. Actually, societies as a whole function this way as well, and why could not talk of a psychotic society, it is easy to understand what is meant by schizophrenic, violent, and/or entertainment-happy populace.
There are instances where the repression succeeds. Other instances where it fails. A certain discontent results from not being able to implement goals that have been produced within the sphere of licit or illicit social interactions. Sublimation and repression are the basic reactions to this dissatisfaction. Now at the social level, there are means of accommodating and integrating certain goals that are not widely acceptable: social change allows for this whenever social-historical institutions are due to adapt to the changes of its productions. Social-historical institutions adapt either peacefully or forcefully, through so called social revolutions. Nothing in revolutions is external to the social-historical course itself. It would be deluded to think that human beings can effectuate any changes that the social-historical conditions are not ready and set for, or even calling for. This reification of the social-historical will not be construed as such if the social-historical institutions are described as then sum total of human events and interpretations stratifying to the point before change: here, we are close to Diodorus KronosÃ’ affirmation of motion and possibility: nothing will happen differently than the way it happened, or more precisely, potentiality is realized possibility and nothing else. This is what is otherwise known as "contingency becoming necessity." Since history is written after the fact, it is tautological: nothing can be described differently from the way it is--even though we are not here addressing the question of communication and are assuming a perfect concordance between description and events which will prove to be an impossibility and an illusory subliminal creation.
Thus, no matter how much individuals struggle to change, change is not possible outside of the social-historical conditions, and whatever contributions of so-called individuals to the overall social-historical development is already embedded by what the social-historical has invested in this so-called individual. Let us change terminology. The individual should be called the multiple self and society should be called the social imaginary. There is no multiple self outside of the social imaginary. It is the social imaginary that gives all significations to the multiple self and the multiple self flourishes on that basis: even though the particular occurences or experiences that it endures are not shared by other multiple selves, they are still part of the social imaginary and embedded in it in a positive way. Let us imagine a large receptacle. The receptacle is filled with water and wine. Let us imagine a small receptacle that is thrown into the larger receptacle. That receptacle is also filled with water and wine. Assuming that water and wine mix and produce various concentrations, the concentrations in the main receptacle may differ from that of the small receptacle but the content is one and the same. Assuming that some bacterial life emerges in the various areas of the receptacle, some bacterial lives are different than others due to the particular concentrations enveloping them. What lives in the small receptacle is different than what lives outside it, but it is all made possible through and by the large receptacle. There is no way the small receptacle could be considered separately from the overall receptacle, as one cannot reduce the small receptacle to the larger one since it has certain differences that qualify it as unique, especially if there are multiple other receptacles within the large receptacle. The multiple self is that small receptacle within a larger receptacle that is the social imaginary. One cannot dissociate the two entirely, they are connected and the connection between the two is integral to defining each.
The emptiness that we talked about earlier is when the multiple self cannot breathe in the social imaginary. It is aware of its situation but cannot breathe, act, fulfill anything that can be construed as a goal or orientation. This emptiness results from a certain reflection, a self reflection on the goals and orientation and the beliefs grounding them. One form of suppressing this emptiness is by creating emptiness all around, a deluded attempt at destruction as if destruction would make a difference. One finds the emptiness overwhelming and either tries to disprove it by believing that something could be done, even if it is an attempt of spreading that emptiness, or sharing it. This is what exemplifies itself in literary and artistic creations, or in aphoristic or philosophical depictions of the state of the world in what claims to be an acute clarity stage of reflection. This is where we come back to nihilism.
The nihilism that we are talking about is of that kind of sublimation. It is not nihilism then if nihilism means or represents the emptiness described above. Nor is revolutionary action aiming at destruction and annihilation nihilism in other sense than the one described above: a sublimational activity attempting at evading the emptiness at issue.
We will not be addressing the question of emptiness then, but a different question, that of nihilism. Nihilism has a relatedness to this emptiness but a reactive one, if one may say so. Communication requires a set of conventional signs and symbols that are productive. They produce meanings. It seems that if anything could be said about the emptiness pointed to above is the groundlessness that takes away from any goal or orientation or any meaningful productivity. Writing, talking, communicating, destroying, all are activities that are, by and in themselves goals and orientations. How can they be compared to that emptiness that is defined as a lack of orientation and goal?
1997 - From Class notes on Nihilism
posted by nihilist at 7:20 PM
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